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FOREIGN VOLUNTARY ASSIGNMENTS FOR THIE BEN-
EFIT OF CREDITORS
PART I.
ALI laws concerning property rights are based upon the broad
- doctrine that every person who owns property may dispose of
the same as he sees fit. The right of disposal of property is
inseparably united to the right of property itself, and indeed is an
essential element of the concept of property. It might even serve
as a definition of property, viewing property as that which one may
dispose of,-a definition too general, it is true, for practical pur-
poses, but undoubtedly a correct and valuable metaphysical
theorem.
But while property must, in its nature, be disposable, it does not
follow that the owner must be free to dispose of it in any way, and
for any purpose, that may be agreeable to his own wishes. Prop-
erty is too vitally related to the structure and organization of society
as a whole, to be left to the unrestrained control of individuals.
Constituting, as it does, a sine gua no of an organized society, since
only through it can the individual lose his subjective isolation and
become objectified in something upon which external society can.
operate, it can hardly be questioned that society is under the high-
est duty to limit the control which individuals may exercise over
property, as a necessary means to social stability and self-preserva-
tion.
It may be laid down as a general proposition that the law opposes
any disposition of property by the owner which has a tendency to
injure others, and many specific rules have been formulated, relat-
ing to particular cases in which such injury is apprehended and
sought to be guarded against. The whole mass of legislation and
judicial decision relative to fraud is illustrative of this. Neces-
sarily, however, the details of these restrictive provisions differ con-
siderably in the various jurisdictions, and those differences give rise
to most of the difficulties of private international law, producing, in
particular, the somewhat confusing adjudications upon the subject
to be considered here, namely, the attitude taken by the courts of
one state towards a voluntary assignment for the benefit of credi-
tors executed in another state, as against attaching creditors. The
conveyance of property by insolvents is very properly a proceeding
which the state watches with jealous care, and it is one in which the
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opportunity for variety in regulative detail is very great. It is my
purpose in this article to analyze the views taken by the courts of
the various American states toward voluntary assignments for the
benefit of creditors made in other states, with special reference to
these differences in assignment laws, and\to the question of the
citizenship of the creditors who question the title of foreign
assignees.
At the outset of the inquiry it will be well to notice a general
limitation applicable to the field as a whole, namely, that the dis-
cussion will necessarily be confined to voluntary, ds distinguished
from involuntary assignments. Under the English law, an assign-
ment by commissioners of bankrupt has the same 'effect beyond
the territorial limits of the jurisdiction where it is executed, as a
voluntary common law assignment. But the courts of this coun-
try, with probably the single exception of New Jersey, refuse to
recognize a foreign involuntary assignment as entitled to any con-
sideration as against ,attaching creditors, with a further possible
exception, in cases where the creditor is a citizen of the state, of the
assignment, as will be noted hereafter.
The earliest case upon this point is that of Taylor v. Geary,I
where the court said that "the commission of bankruptcy against
the defendants in England, does not secure their effects here;-but
they remain, as before, transferable by them, and open to the
attachment of their creditors, -as well British as American.". And
in Milne v. More o, 2 also a leading case, the Pennsylvania court
held American creditors entitled to similar rights against the prop-
erty of an English bankrupt.
In 1820, however, Chancellor Kent handed down a decision in
Holm es v. Rersen,3 in which he adopted the E nglish view, and
allowed the English bankrupt law to cover property in New York,
though with one limitation, namely, that the title of the foreign
assignees in bankruptqy dated from the assignment, andnot from the
commission of the act of bankruptcy. He tried, not vithout softie
plausibility, to place voluntary and involuntary assignments upon
the same grounds, by calling attention to the fact that a so-called
involuntary assignment is really voluntary, since it is a mere formal
sequence from the act of bankruptcy, which is a voluntary act.
But this doctrine found little favor even in the state where it was
announced, and in spite of the respect and deference accorded to the
I (1787). Kirby (Coon.), 313. 
2 (1814). 6 Binney. 353. 
3 4 Johns., CII. 460.
3 4 So1hns., Cbz. 460. .2 (1787). Mrby (Comm), 313. 2(1814), 6 '3nnmey, 353.
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great chancellor who gave the opinion, the rule was condemned in
Holmes v. Remse2.- Platt, J., who spoke for the court, made light
of the reasoning by which it was attempted to identify voluntary
and involuntary transfers. The E nglish cases, upon which the case
in 4 Johns. Ch. rested, were reviewed, and only two of them were
found to support the doctrine. From these two, however, the court
frankly dissented, and the ieasons for dissent were given in sub-
stance as follows:-
1. A discharge of a bankrupt affords no relief from his foreign debts, and
it is unequal and inconsistent to deprive him of his foreign resources. If the
debts remain, his means for meeting them should not be taken away.
2. In the case of administration and distribution, the ke rei silae pre-
vails over the law of the d6micile as to creditors. There is no reason why the
rule should be different in cases of bankruptcy. Anomalies are inconvenient
in the law, and should not be allowed without strong reason.
3. The expense and delay of going abroad to prove debts, and to claim
dividends, may be extremely inconvenient.
4. If it be an advantageous rule, let it be the subject of treaty, and then
our rights will not depend on the indefinable and capricious theory of judicial
comity, but on the force of positive obligation.
5. Great Britain has a strong and peculiar interest in contending for the
rule, which the United States does not have, since her merchants and manu-
facturers credit abroad vastly more than they owe to foreign creditors, and
by this rule she "draws to herself the distribution of all the effects which her
lucrative commerce has dispersed over the globe."
The authority of the first Holmes v. Remsen was thus a short-
lived one. Chancellor Kent, when he wrote his Commentaries,
noted the difference between the English rule and the rule which
had already become distinctive of American law, and conceded that
his decision in Holmes v. Remsen had come to an untimely end.
The doctrine of the first Holmes v. Remsezn did, however, gain a
foothold in two states, which was not affected by its subsequent
overruling in New York. One was Ohio. The Supreme Court of
that state, in Rogers v. Allen, 2 declared it a well settled doctrine
that a commission of bankruptcy vests in the trustees the personal
property, whether situate within the jurisdiction that grants the
commission or not, and cites the first case of Holmes v. Remsen,
probably in ignorance of the fact that that case had been overruled
for six years in New York, Having once adopted this view, the
doctrine has been adhered to until recently, in spite of the almost
universal current of American authority against it. Thus, the Cir-
2 (1822). 20.Tohns., 229. 2(1828), 3 Ohio. 488.
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cult Court of the United States, sitting in Ohio, as late as 1860,
declared in iclkham v. Dillo ,1 that courts would give effect.to the
title of foreign assignees of an insolvent debtor, "whether the, in-
solvent made the transfer himself, or the law of the state of his
domioile made it for him," citing Holmes v. Remsen.2 But it appears
that Ohio has at least partially receded. from its former position, for
in Johnson v. Sjarp,3 the court distinguished between bankruptcy
and involuntary assignment, holding that a foreign assignment in
bankruptcy would not be recognized as against Ohio creditors, and
that "possibly the same may be said when the preference is sought
over an involuntary assignment of the debtor's property made in
invilum, or by operation of law."
In New Jersey, however, the doctrine appears well settled that
there is no practical distinctions to be drawn between a voluntary
assignmentand onemade by operation of law. In Afoorev. Bonnell,4
the court, in a well-considered opinion, said that it could perceive
no substantial difference between an assignment voluntarily made,
and one executed under the compulsion of an insolvent or bankrupt
law, and the one shouldbe given extra-territorial effect to the same
extent as the other.
But aside from the holdings in New Jersey and Ohio, American
authority seems to be unanimous in declaring that there is a clear
and well-defined distinction between involuntary transfers of prop-
erty, which work by operation of law, and voluntary conveyances,
and that while the latter may take effect upon property anywhere,
the former have no operation outsidethe jurisdiction where they are
made.5
But while the distinction here noted is thus generall& recognized;
there is still much room for reasonable differences of opinion as to
whether a given assignment is voluntary or involuntary. It may
contain elements suggestive of both hinds. Thus in Barth v.
Bacdge,8 it was strongly argued by counsel for the assignee that
the Wisconsin assignment was voluntary, but the Couit of Appeals
of New York held that while under the statute the transfer was
I Led. Cas. No. ft. 617- 4 Johns., Ch.460.
3 (1877).3t Obio, SL 611. 4 (1864), 31 XN. Z. 90.
GThe cases ofWalters v. Whitlock (18W0). 9 Ma. 86: 3elI y v. Crapo (1871), 45 X. "'. 86;
Willitts v. Waite (182).25. .. s5: Barth v,, Backus (1893). 140 N. .230; and Paine v. Lester
(1876), 44 Conn. 196. allcontain excellent discussions of this distinction between voluntary
and involuntary assignments.
6 (1893). 140 X.Y. 230.
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voluntary, yet the law then stepped in to regulate the distribution,
thus making the statute in substance a bankrupt law. Practically
an opposite conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire in Sanderson v. Bradford.1 So in Secuity Trst Co. v.
Dodd, Mead & Co., 2 the Supreme Court of the -United States was
called upon to harmonize apparently inconsistent holdings by the
Minnesota Supreme Court as to the voluntary or involuntary char-
acter of the Minnesota assignment law. But it is outside the scope
of this discussion to do more than suggest the question of the
nature of assignments. - Cases in which it has been held that the
foreign assignment was involuntary, are, under the American, doc-
trine, at once deprived of any bearing upon the question of extra-
territorial validity. Hence, in pursuing the subject further, that
class of cases will be excluded from consideration.
The general. rule, as found repeatedly laid down in the cases, is
that a voluntary general assignment made in one state, and there
held to be valid, or which is valid at common law, will be recog-
nized and enforced by the courts of another state as respects prop-
erty situated within the latter state. To this rule there are two
classes of exceptions, one based on the citizenship of the attaching
creditors and the other on the form or subject matter of the assign-
ment. Citizenship may operate in favor of the attaching creditors
or it may operate against them, depending upon whether they are
domiciled in the state of the forum or in the state of the assign-
ment. The form or subject matter of the assignment can only
operate against them, if deemed to have any effect, since additional
requirements in a foreignI assignment law, over and above the
requirements of the law of the forum, can give no additional valid-
ity to the assignment, while the lack of any. one of the require-
ments found in the law of the forum, may be deemed to render the
foreign law invalid and the title of the foreign assignee imperfect as
against the claim of attaching creditors.
The question, how far these exceptions are recognized by the
American courts will now be taken up. It is to be noted, how-
ever, that the exceptions of the first class, namely, those based on
citizenship, are controlling .whenever they affect the case at all, so
that the exceptions of the second class apply only in cases where
the question of citizenship does not enter. In discussing these
exceptions, therefore, those based on citizenship will be first dis-
I U89), ION H, . 260. t- (18M), 173 U. S. 624.
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posed of, leaving the other exceptions to be treated as constituting
an unmixed question relating to the inherent validity of the assign-
ment itself.
I. W v P- T=E CREDITOR IS A CITIZEN OV TIM STATE OV THa
FORUM.
The leading case in this country which sanctions the doctrine
that creditors who are citizens of the state of the forum have a
greater claim to consideration at the hands of the court than other
suitors, is Ingraham v. Geyer 1 a case that has been widely discussed
but rarely approved. In this case an assignment for the benefit of
creditors was made in Pennsylvania. Only such creditors were to
be benefited as should give an absolute discharge of their debts.
Massachusetts creditors attached property within that state and the
Massachusetts court sustained them as against the Pennsylvania
assignee. The court said:-
"But supposing the assignment to have legal effect in the state of Penn-
sylvania, so as to bind the creditors within that state; it does not follow that
it is to be received here, to the prejudice of creditors who are our own citizens.
. . . To give effect to this assignment so as to intercept therlien obtained
by a creditor here, under the laws of our own state, whdn by the effect of that
assignment he would be deprived of all opportunity of participating with the
creditors in Pennsylvania in the proceeds of the debtor's effects, would be an
undue partialty towards foreign creditors, not warranted by the principles
of justice, nor required by the comity of nations."
It is true that this assignment would have been void if made 'in
Massachusetts, but the decision evidently does not hang upon that.
point, for in Fall River Iron Works v. Croade,2 the foreign assign-
ment was one which would have 'been valid if made in Massachu-
setts, as the court admitted in the opinion, and -et, in afirning
Ingraham v. Geyer, the court said that the two cases could not be
distinguished "by the slightest shade," and that no reason was
apparent why Massachusetts processes of attachment should be made.
"subordinate to the voluntary insolvent laws of private individ-
uals of other states," defeating an established remedy which the law
gives to the inhabitants of this state.
Whether this decision would be followed to -day in Massachusetts
is somewhatdoubtful. There have been numerous cases in which
attaching creditors, who were citizens of Massachusetts, have been
aided as against a foreign assignee, but they have been cases in
which the assignment was not wholly in conformity with the
3 (1816), 13Was. 146. -a (im). 15 Picia n.
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requirements in Massachusetts. Such were Zicey v. Thlomson,'
where the assignment containedpreferences, and Pierce v. O'Brien,2
where there was no consent of creditors, and hence, by the Massa-
chusetts law, no consideration for the assignment.
But in Train v. Iendall,3 a general assignment was made in
New York, which was assented to by creditors holding claims
exceeding in value the property assigned, and in this respect as
well as in others, conforming to the laws of Massachusetts. Domes-
tic creditors sought to secure themselves by attachment in Massa-
chusetts, but their claims were rejected. The court does not refer
to Ingraham v. Geyer or F-all River Iron Works v. Croade, but says
that if the assignors had been domiciled in Massachusetts, the
assignment would have been good as against an attaching creditor,
and that "there is nothing in our laws that invalidates the assign-
ment because Kendall Brothers are domiciled in New York."
This does not seem to indicate a very hearty endorsement of the
doctrine of the two preceding cases. But in Frank v. Bobbifl, 4 the
court appears to swing back toward the earlier rule. Property in
Massachusetts was covered by a general assignment for the benefit
of creditors, made in North Carolina by a citizen thereof, and a
citizen of Maryland attached the Massachusetts property. The
court said:-
"As to the claim of the plaintiffs that they should stand as -well as if they
were citizens of this state, it maybe said, in the first place, that the qualifica-
tion attached to foreign assignments is in favor of our own citizens as such, n
and in the next place, that the assignment beingvalid by the lawof the place
where it was made, and not adverse to the interests of our own citizens nor
opposed to public policy, no cause appears for pronouncingit invalid."
This is doubtless a recognition that the early doctrine has never
been formally condemned, though the facts of the case gave occa-
sion for no more than this negative and inferential form of
statement. Perhaps the court would have asserted the doctrine
positively if the circmnstances had called for it, but however that
may be, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachussetts has never,
since 1833, squarely announced a policy of favoring domestic cred-
itors for no other reason than that they were its own citizens.
Maine has followed the doctrine of Massachusetts as laid down in
Ilz, gaham v. Geyer, and has apparently remained true to it with less
compunction than its originator. In Fox v. Adams,5 a case almost
1 (1854). 1 Gray. 243. 2 (1880), 129 Mass. 314. 3 (1884), 137 Mass. 366.
4 (1891). 155 Mass. 112. r (1828), 5 me. 245.
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as well known as the Massachusetts case, a firm doing business in
Boston made a general assignment for the benefit of creditors with
-preferences. Its validity was questioned by attaching creditors in
Maine, and the court, after discussing the effect of the shortness of
the time within -which creditors were to become parties to the
instrument of assignment, said:-
"But we do not place the decision of the case upon this point; but upon
the ground that ageneral assignment by an insolvent debtor in another juris-
diction, shall not be permitted to operate upon property in thisstate, so as to
-defeat the attachment of a creditor residing here."
The court cited Ingraham v. Geyer, and practically based its
decision on that case. In 1859 the case of Feck v. Bugbeel came
before the same court, and it declared unhesitatingly that Fox v.
Adams was the established law of the state. And as late as 1880,
in (Zhafee v. Fourth Nat. Bank,2 the doctrine was reaffirmed, and
the court expressly declared, construing Boston Iron Co. v. Boston
Locomotive Works,' that the privilege could not be extended to
non-resident creditors.
In Illinois, also, the doctrine has been endorsed to its widest
extent. In the case of Heyerv. Alexandr 4 an assignment for the
benefit of creditors was made in Missouri, covering land in Illi-
nois. The assignment was valid by Illinois law, but it was claimed
that the trust should not be enforced as against Illinois creditors.
The court held that the conveyance was operative in Illinois only
by the comity between the states, that comity did not require that a
foreign debtor be allowed to place his property in trust so as to
defeat his creditors in the state where the property was situated,
and that the states have a right to discriminate in favor of domestic
creditors, a principle, the court said, fully recognizedby the framers
of the federal constitution. This case, which has been approved in
May v. JPirst Nat. Bank5 and in Smith v. Lamson Bros.6 goes as
far as any of the Maine or Massachusetts cases.
Finally, this extreme view has very recently been adopted in the
state of Washington, in two cases, .-EaApy v. Prickett7 and Bloom-
ingdale v.. Weil.8 In the former, the court, while recognizing the
distinction between voluntary and involuntary assignments, seems
to take the view that all voluntary assignments should be treated as
statutable assignments, and that all statutable assignments, without
2 48 Me. 9. 71 Me. 514. 3 (1862). 51 me. 555.
4 (1884),108 1L 385. (1837). 122 M. 551. 6 (1900), 184 IlL.71.
7 (19011. 24 Watsh. 290" 8 (902). - Wash. -. 70 Pac. 94.
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regard to the nature of the statute, should only be allowed to oper-
ate in a foreign jurisdiction subject to the claims of local credit-
ors, thus in effect holding that local creditorswil always be allowed
to defeat the title of a foreign assignee. However, it is to be noted
that Security Yrust -Co. v. Dodd, Mead & Co.,' upon which the
court mainly relies, does not sanction such reasoning. In the
second case, Bloomingdale v. Wkeil, the doctrine of Hafipy v. Prick-
ell was reaffirmed, and the court expressly limited the right to
question foreign assignments, to resident creditors of the state of
the forum.
It is believed that these four states stand alne in their adherence
to a policy of giving domestic creditors in all cases a preference over
foreign assignees. "A case in the United States Circuit Court for
the district of Indiana, Schroder v. om~pkins,2 contains this lan-
guage: "The attaching creditors in the present case were non-resi-
dents of this state. It is firmly settled that such creditors do not
occupy as favorable a situation as if they were citizens of this
State." But the single case cited as authority for this rather
sweeping statement is Brank v. Bobbill (su rz), a Massachusetts
decision, and I believe the Supreme Court of Indiana has never
subscribed to that doctrine.
In many cases the courts make use of general qualifying language,
which may or may not mean that citizens of the state of the forum
will receive greater consideration than foreigners. The cases do not
require the question to be raised, and the qualification is probably
insertedsimply out of abundant caution. Thus in Schuler v. Israel ,3
Justice Brewer declared that an assignment valid where made will be
valid in Missouri (the district in which the court was sitting), except
as it conflicts with the rights of resident creditors, and yet only two
years before, the Supreme Court of Missouri had held, in Askew
v. La Cygne Bank,4 that resident creditors enjoyed no special
privileges, where the foreign assignment was not of such a
nature as to be void if made in Missouri. But the opinion in Scku-
ler v. Israel was scarcely more than a quotation from Burrill on
Assignments, and contained no reasoning. Similar statements
occur in other cases.
5
1 (1898). 173 U. S. 624. 2 (13), 58 Fed. IL 672.
(18W,27 Fed.L R. 4 83 Mo. 369
Baconv. Horne (1889), 123 Pa. St. 452: %iliamst. xemper etc. Co. (1896). 4 Oki. 145;
Fenton v. 3 dwards (1899), 126 Cal. 43.
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Anbther group of courts takes a less extreme view, and holds
that domestic creditors will be favored only when the assignment
which they seek to avoid is antagonistic to. the domestic assign-
ment law. If the assignment, valid where made, is also in accord
with the law of the state of the forum, even citizen creditors are
bound by its terms.
This appears to be the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court
of Louisiana. In Beirme v. Pafo= an assignment for the benefit
of creditors was made in Tennessee. with preferences. Citizens bf
Louisiana garnisheed property in the hands of Louisiana debtors of
the assignor. The court said that, granting the validity and bind-
ing effect of the assignment in Tennessee, it did not follow that
it should be received and enforced in this state to the injury of
creditors who were citizens of Louisiana. Comity, it was declared,
could not require the enforcement on property in Louisiana, to the
prejudice of Louisiana citizens, of an assignment which, had it been
made in Louisiana, would have been vbid by reason of its prefer-
ences.
So, also, in New Jersey, the court has held that domestic creditors
may question the validity of an assignment made under a foreign
law when the assignment contravenes the law or policy of New
Jersey, but that this privilege is limited to citizens of the state and
does not extend to non-residents who come into the state courts as
suitors. In Bently v. Wkillemore2 the Court of Errors and Appeals
said:-
"The true rule of law and policyis this: thatavoluntaryassignment made
abroad, inconsistent, in substantial respects, with our statutes. should xiot be
put in execution here to the detriment of our own citizens, but that, for all
other purposes, if valid by the lex loci, it should be carried fully into effect."
And the United States Circuit Court, sitting in New Jersey, in the
case of Halsted v. Slraus,3 following Bentley v. Whiltemore,
declared that the execution of foreign assignments would be enforced
by the courts of N ew Jersey as a matter of comity, except where it
would injure the citizens of the state, but that then it would not be
enforced.
Georgia, also, has followed this doctrine, in Afiller v. i'er-
naghan,4 and Missouri, in Bryan v. Brisbin5 . Kentucky seems
to have come to the same position, though her court originally
expressed approbation of the Massachusetts doctrine of favor-
1 (1841),17a. 589. 2 (1865), 19N. J..462. 3 (1887),32 Fed. . 279.
4 (1876), s6 Ga. 155. r (1858), 26 .Mo. 423.
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ing home creditors in all cases. In the case of Johnson v.
Pa7 ker' a resident of Ohio made a voluntary assignment for the
benefit of creditors to an Ohio assignee. Two citizens of Kentucky
attached the debts due to the insolvent from another citizen of Ken-
tucky. While the court found another ground upon which to base
its decision, it strongly suggested that in its opinion domestic
creditors ought to be favored as against the foreign assignee, even
when the assignment was valid by the laws of both jurisdictions.
But in 1886, in Loflin v. eling,2 the reasoning in Johnson v.
Parker was repudiated, and the court declared that it saw no reason
why a foreign assigneeshould not be aided by Kentucky courts, when
he claimed under an assignment valid where made and conforming
to the law and policy of Kentucky, notwithstanding the effort of
domestic creditors to obtain priority by attachment. Yet where the
assignment was not 'in harmony with the laws of Kentucky, the
court held, in Matthews v. Lloyd,3 that it would nevertheless be
enforced when no domestic creditors would be prejudiced thereby,
but not otherwise.
It is probable that Michigan, also, should be placed in this group.
In the case of Palmer v. MasoZ4 the court held that a resident
creditor should receive no special favor as against a foreign assignee,
where the property attached was land, and the foreign assignment
contravened no law of Michigan. The court suggested that a dif-
ferent rule might perhaps be adopted if the attached property were
movable, but it is difficult to see any reason for such a distinction.
A third group of courts takes the still more liberal view that
domestic creditors have in no case any greater claim to prioritythan
non-resident creditors, and that even where the foreign assignment
is such that it would have been invalid if executed in the state of
the forum, citizens are not thereby enabled to avoid it by reason of
their citizenship.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut declared its adherence to this
-view in the comparatively recent case of lirst Nat. Bank v.
Walker.5 In that case a voluntary assignment for the benefit of
creditors was made in New York, and a Connecticut creditor
attached a debt due the insolvent. The plaintiff based his claim
of priority on the fact that he was a citizen of the state of the forum,
and that comity required a court to recognize a foreign assignment
2 (168),4 Bush, 149.
4 (1879).42 Micb. 146.
2- 83 .. 649. 3 (1890),89 KY. 6Z5.
5(IS91), 61 Conn. 154.
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only when it did not involve any deprivation of a resident credit-
or's rights. But the court refused to acknowledge the soundness of
this position, and expressly denied that any distinction was recog-
nized by the courts of Connecticut between a resident and a non-
resident creditor in respect to the validity of foreign assignments.
Equally emphatic on this point is the holding -of the Supreme
Court of South Carolina. In ex Parte Di ckinon,1 an assignment
was made in New York containing preferences as required by the
New York statute. Such preferences were, by South Carolina law,
declared to render an assignment null and void and of no effect
whatever. The court held the assignment void as against non-res-
ident attaching creditors, but the decision was based expressly upon
the fact of the preferences and not on the ground that the creditors
were not citizens. The court said that, while the courts of some
states drew a distinction between the rights of residentand non-res-
ident attaching creditors, recognizing the priority of a7 resident
attaching creditor over an assignment valid by the law of the state
where'it was executed but invalid by the law of the state where it
was sought to be enforced, but denying such priority to a non-resi-
dent creditor,
"Such a distinction we are not inclined to recognize; but on the contrary,
prefer to accept the language of Danforth, 3., in Hibernia Nat. Batk v.
Lacombe, 84 N. Y. 367: 'Once properly in court and accepted as a suitor,
neither the law, nor the court administering the law, will admit any distinc-
tion between the citizen of its own state and that of another.' "
The New York case here cited was not one involving a voluntary
assignment for the benefit of creditors, but the policy of the court
respecting the point here in question is clearly stated. So in Rhode
Island, in Runt v. Laitro5.2 the Supreme Court made use of the
following vigorous and pointed language in regard to the extra-
territorial effect of assignments:-
"It is certainly unfortunate that between civilized nations, and especially
the states united under one federal government, there should not exist such a,
community of interest and feeling, and such a confidence in each that justice
will be everywhere equally administered to the citizens and subjects of all, as.
to allow full sway to that principle of general law, that the transmission and
conveyance of personal property shall follow the law of the domicile of him
who conveys it, or from whom it is transmitted, no matter wherethe property
may be locally situated. The grand policy of this rule, so favorable to.
commerce and to kindly relations of all sorts, and its inherent justice, in
allowing the owner to apply his property to the purposes, and in the mode, to
which he is accustomed as lawful, commend it to universal prevalence, and
I(188, 9s. c.453. 2 (18610 R. L..
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far outweigh the petty advantages which are occasionally obtained by setting
at naught the rule, under some notion of local policy and separate inter-
ests."
And lastly, Vermont has taken decided ground against any dis-
tinction between the privileges enjoyed by residents and by non-
residents. In Hanford v. Paine3 Chief Justice Redfield, in a nota-
ble opinion, discussed with great force and candor the attitude in
regard to foreign involuntary assignments which ought to prevail
among the American states, criticising with severity the narrow
and short-sighted policy of favoring home creditors as such. His
opinion is characterized by a remarkable breadth of view and a clear-
ness of comprehension of the true basis for commercial relations
among the states. No abler or more exhaustive discussion of this
branch of the conflict of laws has ever been written by an American
jurist, nor one better calculated to place inter-state relations upon
a just and generous basis.
The federal courts have not shown any uniformity in their treat-
ment of this question. As has been pointed out, the United States
Circuit Court sitting in Indiana, in Schroder v. Tompkins (sufira),
declared in favor of the Massachusetts rule, while the same court,
sitting in New Jersey, in Halsted v. Straus (s=fira), followed the
New Jersey rule. But in Caskie v. Webster 2, Justice Grier, speak-
ing for the federal Circuit Court sitting in Pennsylvania, said:-
"I know there are some cases to be found in which the courts of some of
the states of this Union have decided that a voluntary assignment for the
benefit of creditors, valid by the law of the creditor's [owner's?] domicile, will
be disregarded, where it is prejudicial to the interests of attaching cred-
itors in other states, or invalid by the laws of the state, where the
debt or property is attached. Such is Ingraham v. Geyer, cited at the
bar. But these decisions are not binding as authority beyond the
states, in which they were made, and the counsel have not brought to
our notice any case, controlling us, where the doctrine of them has been
affirmed. Sitting here as a court of the United States, we do not thiik that
the different states of this Union are to be regarded as a general thing in the
relation of states foreign to each other. Bspecially ought they not to be so
regarded, in regard to questions relating to the commerce of the country;
which is co-extensive with our whole land, and belongs, not to the states,
but to the Union."
Butthe federal Circuit Court sitting in Maine has gone still farther,
and in the state where Pox v. Adams has been repeatedly affirmed
by the Supreme Court, has refused to be controlled by that decision.
This federal court, in the recent case of Stowe v. Belfast Savings
I (28W), 32 VL 442, 2- (1&51). 2 wan. Jr. 131.
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.Bank condemned the doctrine of .lox v. Adams, expressly refused
to follow it, and sustained the title of a foreign assignee against the
claims of an attaching creditor who was a citizen of Maine.
The Supreme Court of the United States, also, takes the liberal
view. In Livermore v. JenCkes, 2 an assignment with preferences
and a reservation to the assignor was made in Rhode Island, cover-
ing property in New York, and the court held it valid as against
resident attaching creditors, notwithstanding that such an assign-
mentwould have been void if executed in New York.
It will thus be seen, from the cases so far noted, that the four
states of Massachusetts, Maine, Illinois, and Washington, are the
only states whose courts have pronounced in favor of allowing their
own citizens an unrestricted preference over the claims of foreign
assignees. In the six states of New Jersey, Georgia, Missouri,
Louisiana, Kentucky, and Michigan, on the other hand, domestic
creditors, as such, are denied priority except where the assignment
contravenes the law of the state of the forum, while in Connecti-
cut, Vermont, South Carolina, New York, Rhode Island, and,
probably by, weight of authority in the federal courts, domestic and
non-resident creditors stand on an exact e'quality as against the
title of a foreign assignee.
Nothing can be said in favor of the doctrine that, among the
American states, domestic creditors should be privileged to seize
property which, by the lex fori, as well as by the lex loci contraclges,
has been lawfully conveyed to the assignee. Such a rule is a mere
relic of barbarism, and unworthy the countenance or support of a
,civilized commercial state. A widespread adoption of the principle
underlying it would confine commercial enterprise within the bor-
ders of each state, by destroying the sanctity of contract rights out-
side the jurisdiction where the contract chanced to be executed. A
state has a clear duty to protect its own citizens, but not at the
expense of citizens of another state, whose sole offense is too great
faith in the universal recognition of the obligations of contracts.
Where, however, the assignment is not in accord with the laws
of the forum, there is perhaps more reason in holding that citizens
may question it, while foreigners may not. The laws of a state are
passed with the chief object of benefiting the citizens of that state,
and might reasonably be held to be operative in every case where
such benefit would result. Thus, whether an assignment is exe-
6
1 (189). 9z Fe& m. go. 1(1858). 21How. 126.
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cuted in a given state or outside it, creditors in that state are equally
injured by it, if it denies them rights which their own law accords.
them. Yet it may, of course, be answered that where a person
becomes a creditor of a foreign resident he may be presumed to have
done so with a knowledge of the laws of that jurisdiction, and hence
undergoes no unreasonable hardship in holding his claim subject to.
its assignment laws. Prom the standpoint of harmonious inter-
course and equality among the states, however, there is very much
to be said in favor of the liberal rule which gives no superior rights
to citizens in any case, and it is doubtless true that if this rule pre-
vailed widely among the states it would tend to stimulate a greater
popular interest in uniform assignment laws.
3E Dso R. SurLIAND
Uz rvRSITY OF XICHGAN
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FORRIGN VOLUNTARY ASSIGNMENTS FOR THE BENE-
FIT OF CREDITORS
PART II
II. WHERE THE CREDITOR IS A CITIZEN OF THE STATE OF THE
ASSIGNMENT
H ERE there is less contrariety in opinion, for the reason that
the problem is a simpler one. Where a person deliberately
contracts under the laws of one jurisdiction, and then discovers that
the laws of another are more favorable to his claim, it would seem
ifrima faide unfair to other parties interested to allow him to alter
his legal standing by an appeal to foreign laws which were wholly
outside the contemplation of the parties when the contract was
made.
The case is well discussed in Richardson v. Leavitt.1 Here an
assignment for the benefit of creditors, with preferences, was made
in New York, and was valid under its laws. An attachment was
levied upon personal property in Louisiana by New York creditors.
The court said:-
"The violation of the common pledge, by the undue preference given to the
creditors for whose benefit the assignment is made, is the ground on which
the plaintiffs base the invalidity of the assignment. By the laws of New York
no such pledge exists, and the debtor is permitted to make any preferences,
by payment in favor of some creditors to the detriment of others. The law
of New York is the law of the contract between the plaintiffs and defendants.
** To extend the law of Louisiana to the contract made between these
parties in New York, would be to give an extra-territorial application to
them. unwarranted by any consideration."
2
So in Illinois, in the case of Woodward v. B7ooks,3 an assign-
ment for the benefit of creditors was made in Pennsylvania, and
money was attached in Illinois by Pennsylvania creditors. The
court held that, as the assignment was valid in Pennsylvania, and
the attaching creditors were residents of that state, the assignment
would be given effect as against them.
In Einerv. Besle,4 the Supreme Court of Missouri went still fur-
ther, and applied the same rule to the case of a foreign bankruptcy.
1 (1846). 1 La. Ann. 430.
2 Cited and approved in Whitenright v. Leavitt (1849), 4 La. Ann. 351.
3 (1889). 128 11!. 222.
4 (1862). 32Mo. 240.
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Defendants, residents of Louisiana, became bankrupt, and by vir-
tue of the laws of Louisiana all their property passed to a syndic.
Plaintiff was also a resident of Louisiana, and'a creditor of defen-
dants. He tried to secure himself by suing out an attachment
against property of the defendants in Missouri. But the court
refused to allow him rights which his own state denied him, saying
that no good reason appeared why a creditor residing in the same
state with the bankrupt, and subject to its local jurisdiction, should
be permitted, through the courts of other states, to obtain an advan-
tage over other creditors-by attaching property outside the state of
the assignment.'
This view seems to be all but universal in the United States.
The following cases are directly in point, and sustain the doctrine
without suggesting a doubt of its correctness: In Rhode Island,
Noble v. Smith;2 in Pennsylvania, Bacon v. Rorne; in Missouri,
Thuston v. Rosenfleld;4 in Massachusetts, Benedict v. Pamenter,5
Marlin v. Potter,6 Daniels v. Willard,7 Burlock v. Taylor,8 Bho-
len v. Cleveland;8 in Vermont, Ward v. Morrison; 0 in New Jersey,
Moore v. Bonnell." In this last case the court declared that the
rule was universal, and that whenever the decision was directly
upon the point, the American courts had refused to allow the credi-
tor, resident in the state of the assignment, to assail the assignee's
title.
In Faulkner v. Hyman,12 the attaching creditors constituted a
partnership, some of the partners being residents of the state where
the assignment was made, and others residents of Massachusetts. It
was held that this did not preclude the partnership from attacking
the assignment, although it was valid where made.
There is, however, one conspicuous instance of dissent from this
general rule. The courts of New York makeno distinction between
creditors resident in the state where the assignment is made, and
any other creditors, domestic or foreign. This was clearly laid down
I In support of this doctrine the court cited Lowry v. Hall (1841). 2 W. & S. 129; Sander-
son v. Bradford (1839), 10 N. H. 260; Whipple v. Thayer (1834). 16 Pick. 25; and Van Hook
v. Whitlock (1841). 26 Wend. 43.
2 (1860). 6 PL 1. 446.
3 (1888). 123 Pa. St.452. 4 (1868).42 Mo. 474.
5 (1859). 13 Gray, 88. 6 (1858). 11 Gray, 37.
7 (1834). 16 Pick. 36, 8 (1835), 16 Pick. 335.
9 (1828).5 Mason 175 (U. SC. C.) 20 (1853), 25Vt. 593.
11 (1864). 31 N. J.L. 90. I (1886). 142 Mass. 53.
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in Hibernia Nat. Bank v. Lacombe,' and more recently in Barth v.
Backus.2 In the latter case the court, by Chief Justice Andrews,
said:-
"We have refused to adopt the distinction made in some of the states, and
have placed the right of a creditor coming here from the state of the
common domicile upon the same footing as that of a citizen or resident
creditor."
It seems, also, that the Supreme Court of Iowa is unwilling to
recognize the general rule. In Moore v. Church,3 all the parties
were residents of New York, where the assignment, void by Iowa
law, was executed. The court made no special point of the fact
that the creditors were domiciled in the same state as the assignee,
but held the assignment void on the ground that the Iowa property
embraced by it was real property. But in Franzen v. Hutchinson,
4
the same question arose as to the personalty, and the court said it
could see no reason for applying a different rule as to personal
property, and held that where the assignment is invalid by the law
of the forum, any one may raise the objection.
Aside from the New York and Iowa holdings, there appears to be
no exception to the general rule, which is undoubtedly a just and
equitable one, that the creditor cannot, in the courts of another
jurisdiction, question the validity of an assignment for the benefit
of creditors properly executed in his own domicile.
III. VAIIDITY OF FOREIGN ASSIGN=ENTS WHEN UNAFFECTED BY
THE QUESTEION OF CITIZENSHIP
The specific questions arising under this head are numerous,
owing to the great variety in the details of assignment statutes.
The classification adopted is more for convenience of treatment than
to develop fundamental distinctions in principle. The chief ground
of contention is over preferences, and this topic will therefore
receive a fuller discussion than others.
PREFERENCES. In some states, following the common law,
assignments with preferences are allowed, and in some they are even
required. But in most states they are deemed fraudulent.
. Now will the courts of a state in which such assignments are
invalid, recognize the title of a foreign assignee under an assign-
ment containing preferences, as against attaching creditors? No
question of citizenship enters here. That has already been dis-
S(1881), 84 N. Y. 367.
s(1886,) 70 Ia. 208.
2{1893), 140 N, Y. 230.
4(1895). 94 la. 95.
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posed of. The problem now relates solely to the substance of the
assignment as entitling it to foreign recognition. Under the gen -
eral rule that a court will refuse to sanction that which its own
law or policy condemns, it might be supposed that a foreign assign-
ment with preferences would be totally ignored in a state whose
law or policy forbade preferences. But the decisions are very con-
flicting, for the reason that opinions differ as to the exact purpose
which laws against preferences are intended to serve.
One line of cases holds that laws against preferences are intended
solely to regulate domestic assignments, and that there is therefore
no reason for questioning the validity of a foreign assignment with
preferences, simply because it would have been void as to creditors,
if executed within the state of the forum. A good example is
afforded by Egbert v. Baker.' Here an assignment was made in
New York, with preferences as allowed by the law of that state,
but by the laws of Connecticut such an assignment was declared
void. The court said:-
"The general principle is, that an assignment, or other contract, good
where made, is good everywhere. But we are asked to make an exception to
the rule on the ground that the assignment giving a preference to creditors
contravenes the policy of our insolvent law, whikh forbids preferences and
seeks to divide the assets ratably among creditors. In a legal sense it cannot
be said that a contract, made in the State of New York, in strict conformity
to the laws of that state, and by citizens of that or other states, contravenes
the policy of our law. Our statute was not enacted for such contracts, and
takes no cognizance of them. Such contracts may dispose of property in a
manner not allowed by our law; but that does not concern us, and is certainly
not a sufficient reason for giving our statute an extra-territorial jurisdiction,
especially in a case between citizens of other states, the effect of which would
be to deprive parties of vested rights."
So in Illinois, the statute against preferences is held to apply
only to domestic assignments. In May v. First Nat. Bank,2 a
general assignment for the benefit of creditors, with preferences,
was made in New York, covering land in Illinois. A citizen of
Massachusetts attached the Illinois land. The deed of assignment
was made in accordance with the Illinois law relative to the trans-
fer of real property. Question, Was the assignment valid as against
this attaching creditor? The court held that the preferences did
not invalidate the assignment, because the Illinois statute prohibit-
ing them applied in terms only to assignments executed in Illinois.
Nor did the court think the assignment against the policy of the
1 (1690), 58 Conn. 319. 2 (1887), 122 Ill. S51.
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state, since it was made without the state, and there was con-
sequently no state policy in regard to it.
In Law v. Mills,' where it was objected by creditors that a new
York assignment with preferences could not be enforced in Pennsyl-
vania because the statute forbade all attempts by an insolvent debtor
to prefer one or more creditors before others, the court held that
unless it was shown that the assignment was void under the laws of
New York, it would be recognized as valid in Pennsylvania,
because, on the authority of Speed v. May,2 "the validity
of a voluntary assignment in trust is to be ascertained by the law of
the place of its origin." The same opinion was expressed by the
Supreme Court of Kentucky in Matthews v Lloyd.8
An iiteresting case in which the Supreme Court of the United
States passed upon this question, in reference to the assignment
laws of Idaho is Barnett v. Kfinney. 4 A general assignment with
preferences was made in Utah, valid by the laws there. It pur-
ported to convey property in Idaho, and the title of the assignee to
that property was questioned by an attaching creditor domiciled in
Minnesota. The assignee had already taken possession. The
statute of Idaho prescribed that creditors should share pro rata,
"without priority or preference whatever, and "no assignment of
an insolvent debtor, otherwise than as so provided, is legal or bind-
ing on creditors." The court held that the assignment was neither
in contravention of the Idaho statute, nor opposed to the public
policy therein indicated in respect to citizens of the jurisdiction,
since nothing was clearer than that the statute had reference only to
domestic insolvents.
The same doctrine seems to prevail in Florida,- Van Wyck v.
Read;5 in New Jersey, Bentley v. Whiltemore,6 Varnum v. Camp;7
in Oklahoma, Williams v. Kemfier, etc. Co. , based upon Barnelt
v. Kinney; in Missouri, 7hurston v. Rosenfield;9 in Louisiana,
Richardson v. Leaviti;'1 and in Michigan, Butlerv. Wendell."
On the other hand, a few states take the opposite view, and refuse
to recognize an assignment withpreferences, when by their own law
such assignments are void. Thus in Strickler v. Tinkham,12 a
1 (1851).18 Pa. St. 185. 2 (1851). 17 Pa. St. 91.
s (1890).89 Ky. 625. 4 (1892). 147 U. S,€476. reversing 2 Idaho 706.
(1890). 43 Fed. R. 716 (U S. C. C.) 6 (1868), 19 N. J. Eq. 462.
7 (1833) 13 N.J. L. 326. 8 (1896)4 Oki. 145.
9 (1868). 42 Mo. 474. It, (1846). 1 La. Ann. 430,
12 (1885), 57 Mich. 62. 12 (1866). 35 Ga. 176.
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citizen of Tennessee made an assignment in that state, with prefer-'
ences, covering property in Georgia. A creditor, not preferred,
sued out attachments, after notice of the assignment, which were
levied upon the Georgia goods. The court held that the assign-
ment was obnoxious to the law of Georgia. The general rule was
admitted, that the lex loci governs in determining the validity of a
contract, but subject to exceptions. By the Code, Sec. 9, "The
validity, form and effect of all writings or contracts, are determined
by the law of the place where executed. When such writing or
contract is intended to have effect in this state, it must be executed
in conformity to the laws of this state." Hence this assignment,
which was intended to have effect in Georgia, was held void, not
having been executed in such terms as to be valid according to the
Georgia statute."'
So in Loving v. Pairo,2 a case often cited by the courts of that
state, lands in Iowa were conveyed, in contemplation of insolvency,
by deeds of general assignment for the benefit of creditors, which
deeds were executed in the District of Columbia, the place of the
grantor's domicile. By the terms of these deeds, the claims of cer-
tain creditors were preferred. It was held that the conveyance was
repugnant to the laws of Iowa, and invalid as against a non-resi-
dent attaching creditor, and could not operate even as an assign-
ment in favor of all the creditors in proportion to their respective
claims.
The same doctrine is approved in Delaware, King v. Johnson;3
and in Colorado, Camfibell v. Colorado Coal Co..4 It seems, also, that
the Mississippi rule is the same, though the point was raised only
indirectly, in Byers v. Tabb.5 In South Carolina the court has
held that the statute against preferences is applicable to all assign-
ments, whether domestic or foreign, Exfarte Dickinson,6 though
the statute construed in Russell v. Tunno,7 was held to include only
those executed within the state.
From the foregoing review of the cases, it is clear that the weight
of American authority is against allowing a domestic law against
assignments with preferences, to invalidate a foreign assignment
containing them, when the law of the state where the assignment
was made sanctions the preferences.
I See, also, Mason v. Strickler (1867). 37 Ga. 262. 2 (1859). 10Ia. 282.
3 (1848), 5 Harr. 31. 4 (1885). 9 Col. 60.
5 (1899). 76 Miss. 843. 6 (1888), 29 S. C. 453.
7 (1858). It Rich. L. 303.
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RECORDING AND FILING. Another feature of a valid assignment,
as prescribed in many states, is that it shall be recorded or filed in
the manner indicated by the statute. This gives rise to another
problem in the conflict of laws, namely: Will an unrecorded or
unfiled deed of assignment, valid in the state where made, be recog-
nized in a state requiring such recording or filing, as against attach-
ing creditors?
There is here something of the same conflict of authority, and for
the same reason, but the question just stated is evenmore generally
answered in the affirmative than the same question relative to prefer-
ences.
An excellent case in point is In re Paige Lumber Co.3 A general
voluntaiy assignment for the benefit of creditors was made in Wis-
consin, covering personal property in Minnesota. Its validity was
questioned because it was not filed as required by the Minnesota
statute. It was held that the statute applied only to domestic
assignments, and did not affect the unwritten law relative to the
validity of foreign assignments. The court said:-
"When we consider the general doctrine that thevalidity of foreign assign-
ments, as of foreign contracts, is not to be determined by our laws, common
or statute, regulating generally the making of assignments or contracts,but by
the law of the place where the same was made, it is to be presumed that if
the legislature had intended this act to apply to the case of foreign assign-
ments, making them invalid here, when, but for the act, they would have
been deemed to be valid, that purpose would have been particularly expressed.
Such an intention is not to be inferred from the general terms in which this
act is framed."
This, undoubtedly, states the true rule of construction to be
applied to these statutes.
Wilson v. Ca;son,2 is another excellent case illustrative of the
same doctrine. A voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors
was made in Kentucky, and admitted to be valid there, but it was
claimed that it could not operate to pass title to property in Mary-
land because not recorded under the Maryland statute. The court
held, however, in an able opinion, that the recording statute could
not be deemed to relate to foreign assignments, since it would in
that event preclude persons living in distant countries from dispos-
ing of property in Maryland, because recording would be impossi-
ble within the twenty days, and since it would, indeed, prevent all
non-residents from disposing of such property. because none of
1 (18U), 31 Minn. 136. 2(1857), 12 M¢d.54.
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them could record the conveyance in the county in Maryland where
they reside, not being residents of any county within the state.
Similar views have been expressed in New Jersey, in ]razier v.
Jredericks:' in New York, in Ockerman v. Cross;2 in Connecticut
in Atwood v. Ins. Co. , and Richmondville Mfg. Co. v. Prall,4 and in
Vermont, in Hanford v. Paine.5
But the Supreme Court of Tennessee dissents from this doctrine,
apparently without an effort or desire to construe the statute more
liberally. In Douglas v. Bank,6 an Ohio assignment for the bene-
fit of creditors was held void because not registered according to
the statute. So in Virginia, in Gregg v. Sloan,7 the court takes the
position that an unrecorded foreign assignment would be void as to
tangible property in Virginia, though not as to choses in action.
The statute of Pennsylvania, construed in Steel v. Goodwin,8 is
explicitly directed against foreign assignments, so that the court had
no other course open but to insist upon compliance, and the Geor-
gia statute, construed in Strickler v. 2inkham,9 and Mason v.
Strickler,10 would perhaps be given the same construction in regard
to recording as was given in regard to preferences.
ASsmItiN'S BoNn. In Moore v. Title &' Trust Co.," a Pennsyl-
vania corporation assigned all its properly for the benefit of its cred-
itors, includingpersonal property in Maryland. Objection was made
to the validity of the assignment because the trustee had not filed a
bond, as required by the Maryland statute. Held, that this require-
ment applied only to assignments executed within the state of Mary-
land. The Wisconsin court, in Cook v. VanHorn,12 took the same
view. And in the very recent case of Memfihis Savings Bank v.
Boucens,'3 the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, for the
eighth circuit, held that a Tennessee assignee obtained a valid title
to property in Arkansas,, as against attaching creditors, although
he had failed to file a bond as required by the Arkansas statute,
since, in the opinion of the court, the Arkansas statute was intended
to apply only to domestic assignments.
INVENTORY ATTACZD To ASSIGNMENT. An interesting case
involving this point arose in Georgia, where on account of a par-
1 (1853), 24 N.J. L. 162. s (1873),54N. Y. 29.
8 (1842), 14 Conn. 555. 4 (1833), 9Conn. 487.
5 (1860), 32 Vt. 442. 6 (1896). 97 Tenn. 133.
7 (1882), 76 Va. 497. 8 (1886). 133 Pa. St. 288.
9 (166).35 Ga.176. 10 (1867), 37 Ga. 262.
11 (1896). 82 X&d.288, Is (1892). 81 Wis. 291.
13 (1902). 115 Fed. R. 96.
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ticularly rigid and narrow statute, the courts have so frequently
denied validity to foreign assignments which failed to meet the
statutory test. But in this instance a much more liberal construc-
tion was given to the statute. The case was Birdseye v. Underhill.'
An assignment was made in New York, and credits of the assignor
were garnisheed in Georgia. It was claimed that the assignment
was void in Georgia, although valid in New York, because it did
not contain a full inventory of assets and liabilities, under the
Georgia statute prescribing that when any writing or contract is
intended to have effect in Georgia, it must be executed in conform-
ity to the Georgia laws. But the court took the view that this assign-
ment was not intended to have effect in Georgia, but generally
wherever the assignor had property, and hence did not come within
the terms of the statute. And furthermore, the court said that the
schedules were no part of the contract, and it is only when the con-
tract element violates the state law that the assignment is void.
This construction would practically abrogate the statute so far as
foreign assignments are concerned, and cannot be harmonized with
the decisions in Strickler v. Tinkham and Mason v. Strickler, cited
above.
The same question was raised in Memfikis Savings Bank v.
Houchens,2 and in Hanford v. Paine,' and both the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Vermont held
that the statutory requirement was limited in its application to
domestic assignments.
PossEssioN 3Y ASSiGNSE. But few cases have turned upon the
question of possession in the assignee, as necessary to perfect the
title of the assignee. In Woolson v. Pipher,4 the court declared
that possession of the goods was indispensable to the perfection of
the assignees title, as against the liens of attaching creditors; while
in Union Savings Bank v. Lounge Co.,' it was held that possession
was not essential, but solely because of the peculiar nature of the
property.
So in Rice v. Curtis,' the court held that failure on the part of the
assignee to reduce the assigned pr6perty to pos.ession, defeated his
claim to the property as against attaching creditors, since posses-
sion went to the inherent validity of the assignment. On the other
I !1888), 82 Ga. 142. 2 (1902), 115 Fed. 96,
3 (1860). 32 Vt. 442. 4 (1884). 100 Ind. 306.
& (1898), 20 Ind. App. 325. 6 (1860), 32 Vt. 460.
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hand, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in Mowry v. Crocker,2
declared that the assignment, ifiso facto, vested the title in the
assignee, and this would seem to be the better rule.
ExnPTIoNs. In Pitman v. Marquardt,2 the question arose over
a Kentucky assignment for the benefit of creditors, where the Ken-
tucky law allowed a greater exemption than did the Indiana law,
and the court held the assignment valid notwithstanding the differ-
ence as to the exemption.
As a result of the foregoing analysis of the case, it is clear that,
by the great weight of American authority, statutes regulating
assignments for the benefit of creditors are considered to relate to
domestic assignments only, and the unmistakable tendency of the
courts is to sustain the validity of foreign assignments which, while
valid where made, do not conform to the local law. Any other
doctrine would practically restrict the operation of assignments
within the jurisdiction where executed, for the assignment statutes
of the various states show a very considerable variety in detail.
The cases clearly show a desire on the part of the American courts
to give as full effect as possible to the general rule that contracts
valid where made are valid everywhere, and to closely limit the
scope of the exceptions which over-zealous creditors have sought to
introduce into the law.
EDSON R. SUNDIR=AND
Umnsiy ov MicmGAN
S(1858) 6 Wis. 126.
2 (1898), 20 Ind. Apt). 431.
